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EXAMINATION 



THOMAS L. M'^KENNEY'S REPLY 



TO 



THE REVIEW OF 



HIS NARRATIVE, &c 



BY 



KOSCIUSZKO ARMSTRONG 




NEW YORK: ^ 
R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER, 112 FULTON STREET. 

1847. 



EXAMINATION OF T. L. MCKENNEY'S REPLY TO THE 
REVIEW OF HIS NARRATIVE, &c. 



AFTERa labor of two months, Thomas L. McKenney has been safely 
delivered of what he terms a "Reply" to my review of his narrative." 
A brief examination will determine, whether this bantling be one " of 
fair proportions" and even chances of life, or a rickety monster, born 
but to sprawl, and perish. 

Without metaphor, let me congratulate the Ex-Superintendant of 
Indian Affairs, on having at last discovered the propriety of supporting 
his statement of facts, by evidence, derived from other and more^respect- 
able sources. Under the influence of this new creed, he has sought 
and procured letters from Georgetown friends and associates, intended 
to show that, in his Narrative of the events which led to the capture 
of Washington, and the resignation of General Armstrong, he wrote 
nothing but truth ; and, if chargeable with any offence, it was the 
venial one of having looked on the Secretary's transgressions with too 
much lenity. 

Foremost among these witnesses is a Mr. Smith, who is ushered before 
the public with a flourish of trumpets suited to the dignity of a quondam 
Brigadier of Militia. I was sorry to see this gentleman's letter, — not 
from any ill effects to be feared from such evidence as he has given, 
or can give, but because I find it neither pleasant, nor profitable, to be 
compelled to unravel one tangled skein of misrepresentation after an- 
other. Of General Smith I have no personal knowledge, and, cer- 
tainly, bear him no ill-will : but, by connecting himself with Mr. Mc- 
Kenney, he has made it necessary for me to examine his testimony 
with a strictness, that will give him pain. 

The main question at issue between Mr. McKenney and myself is this: 
Was, or was not. General Armstrong negligent of his duty as Secretary 
of War, before and at the time of the ca'pture of Washington ? There 
are also minor points to be settled between us, — such as, the fictitious 



denunciation of Carrol, and Mr. McKenney's real agency in the 
Georgetown intrigue. Each shall bo noted in its turn : but the most 
important is entitled to precedence. 

In my examination of this question, I shall, whenever I state a fact 
derived from public documents, give my authority at the foot of the 
page, in order that the truth of whatever assertion or quotation I make, 
may be tested by the reader. 

Whatever neglect of duty the Secretary of War was guity of (for, 
in a position like his, negligence was guilt), must have been shown in 
one of three ways. 

1st. In not recommending such addition to the fortified defences of 
Washington, as the exigency of the times required ; and, when the 
invasion took place, omitting the steps necessary to bring together a 
force, competent to resist it. 

2d. In not furnishing the troops with arms and ammunition, and 
makinor no provision for their subsistence in the field. 

3d. In refusing to give orders, having for their object a concentration 
of force, and withholding from General Winder such assistance as the 
Secretary of War may have been supposed able to give. 

In the discussion of these various subjects, I shall, unavoidably, be 
led into details more instructive than amusing. But the brevity of my 
story shall compensate for its dulness. Under the second and third 
heads, the evidence of StuU and Smith shall be fully analysed. 

1st. With regard to the want of fortifications, I will recur to a docu- 
ment showino', that, as eai'ly as June, 1813, General Armstrong pointed 
out their necessity in his answer to the following questions asked by 
a committee of the Senate : — " What provision," said the committee, 
" has been made by the War Department for the protection of the sea- 
board ? Can the protection authorized by law be deemed sufficient ? 
And, if not, what further provision is nece&sary ?" 

The reader will see that the purport of these questions was suffi- 
ciently broad : it embraced past, present, and future, and the reply, 
like the demand, is an admirable specimen of multum in parvo. After 
statincr what had been done, the Secretary says : — " In my opinion, 
the present protection of the sea-board is not sufficient, and the measures 
to be taken for its better defence are of two kizids : addil/.oiud fortifica- 
tions and an increased number of regular troops." He tlien proceeds to 
recommend the erection of works for the purpose of giving more safety 
to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, 
and New Orleans. The only part of his report with which I have to 
do, is that relating to Washington. He says, "A work should be 
erected on Cedar Shoal Point on the Potomac. It cannot he douhted 
but that the seat of the General Government should be placed not merely 
beyond injury, but beyond disturbance from the enemy." It was not, 
however, on defences of earth and stone, that the Secretary relied ; he 
knew, that the best bulwark against attack, is that furnished by the 
breasts and bayonets of disciplined men, and expressed this opinion in 
the following words : — " Under the second general provision (an in- 
creased number of regular troops) I offer the following arrangement of 
permanent garrisons : 



To Districts No. 1 and 2, 2,000 men, 

do 3 and 4, 3,000 men, 

do 5, 3,000 (subsequently No. 10, including 

Washington), 
To District No. 6, 2,000 men, 

do 7, 3,000 men. 



13,000."* 

Here is evidence enough to satisfy the most sceptical, that General 
Armstrong was not blind to the defenceless condition of the capital, and 
projected and recommended measures for its protection, at an early 
period of his administration of the War Department ; and if Congress 
from indifference, carelessness, an impoverished treasury, or that want 
of fixed purpose which characterizes deliberative assemblies, took no 
heed of his recommendations, the candid reader will allow, that he, at 
least, was not censurable for want of foresight. 

I now come to the steps taken by him, when the invasion occurred, 
to bring together a competent military force. In a Cabinet Council 
held on the 1st of July, 1814, President Madison offered for examination 
a plan of defence, matured by him for the special protection of Washington, 
Baltimore, and the country adjacent. This plan consisted in the forma- 
tion of a permanent camp of two or three thousand troops, at some point 
between the East Branch and the Patuxent, while corps of militia 
(amounting in all to ten or twelve thousand men) were required to be 
held in readiness by the neighboring states, for service in case of 
invasion. •{" 

The day after the Council, the War ]\finister created the 10th military 
district, and assigned General Winder to the command.:}: Three days 
afterwards, he made a requisition on the States for ninety-three thousand 
five hundred men ; of this number, six thousand from Maryland, five 
thousand from Pennsylvania, two thousand from Virginia, and the whole 
militia of the district of Columbia, were allotted to Winder's command, 
forming with the regular troops and marines, an aggregate of sixteen 
thousand five hundred men, three thousand of whom the commanding 
General was authorized to call into immediate service on the llth of 
July, and the remainder in case of actual or menaced invasion.^ 

Thus far there is no evidence of " apathy" or " neglect," on the part 
of the Secretary of War, but, on the contrary, the most decisive proof, 
that his duty had been promptly fulfilled. Two weeks after the Cabinet 
Council, and Jive weeks before the landing of the enemy, he had given 
to General Winder whatever authority the War Department could give, 



* See Report to Committee of the Senate made June 10th, 1S13. I have a 
certified copy. 

t See Report of the Committee of Investigation, p. 6. 

i Gen. Winder was selected by President Madison. The Secretary had pro- 
posed the appointment of General Porter of the Artillery, an able and energetic 
man, but one whom high temper and rough manners made no favorite at the 
White House. 

§ See Report of the Committee of Investigation, p. 38. 



to bring together the force allotted by the President to the defence of 
Washington. It would be foreign from my purpose to show, why this 
force was not collected ; — why Maryland offered but a " beggarly 
account of empty" battalions ; — why Pennsylvania was without a re- 
presentative on the field of Bladensburg ; — why Virginia sent forth a 
single regiment of unarmed men* the day before the battle, instead of 
her quota of two thousand ; the causes which led to these results were 
various, but as they had no connexion with the management of the War 
Department, I shall leave them unexplained. f Let the reader, however, 
bear in mind, that notwithstanding the partial failure of the requisitions, 
General Winder found himself, on the 24th of August, at the head of 
an army of nearly seven thousand men (one fifth of whom were regulars, 
seamen and marines), possessing over their enemy tiie decided advan- 
tages of numerical strength, a corps of cavalry, and a well appointed 
train of artillery.:]: 

2d. The next subject of inquiry is, whether the Secretary of War 
neglected to furnish arms and ammunition ; or stinted the provender of 
the patriotic band, assembled for the defence of their domestic hearths. 

The Committee of Investigation, appointed by Congress to inquire 
strictly into all matters having any bearing on the loss of the Capital ; 
— a Committee, composed of men of both parties, and doubly respectable 
from the character and ability of members, say, in the Report, not a 
word of any deficiency in these great requisites. From this silence, I 
am justified in concluding, that the stomachs and cartridge-boxes of the 
Bladensburg heroes were abundantly filled ; and that weapons were put 
in their hands, which, to have been used with effect, needed but the 
possession of a quality which nature alone can give. It is true, how- 
ever, that there is a letter on record of General Walter Smith, in which 
that officer complained, that one company of self-styled riflemen belong, 
ing to his brigade, were armed with muskets, instead of the weapons 
they wished; but such was the evident absurdity of this complaint, that 
the committee did not even deign to notice it.^ 

I said in my " Review," that " the difficulties alleged to have exist- 
ed, with regard to arms and equipments, would, on inquiry, be found 



* See Report of the Committee, p. KJ.3. Letter of Adjutant General Gooch to 
the Secretary of War, from which I make the following extract : — " Your requisi- 
tion on the militia of this State, hearing date the 4th instant, has heen received. 
Jlrms, ammunition, &fc., will be placed in the hands of the w/iole." Yet Colonel 
Minor's regiment arrived ivifhout arms. Whose fault was this ? 

t Whoever may wish to obtain a clear understanding of the causes which led to 
the failure of the militia requisitions, made by the Government on the States of 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, will fmd them fully set forth in tlie report 
of the Committee of Investigation. 

t The Maryland force at Bladensburg consisted of 3,U00 men; the Georgetown 
and Washington militia 2,000; the regulars, marines and seamen 1,40(3; and 
Minor's Virginia Regiment at the Capital, 700. Young's brigade is not included 
in this estimate because acting on detached service; there were twenty-four pieces 
of artillery. The British force consisted of 3,500 men, 1500 of whom were engaged. 
See Dr. Cattlet's testimony. 

§ Report of Committee", p. 201. I recommend the perusal of this letter to 
whoever enjoys a hearty laugh. Smith's Report is such as Capt. Bobadil would 
have written, had Bobadil commanded the Georgetown Brigade. 



either not justly chargeable to the Secretary of War, or of a nature so 
frivolous, as to take from them all importance." As if to prove the 
truth of this remark, Mr. McKenney has produced a letter from the 
commander of the self-called Rifle company. This sagacious gentle- 
man — his name is Stall — evidently believes, that the substitution of one 
weapon for another in the arming of his hundred men, was the most 
efficient cause of the capture of Washington ! According to him, his 
riflemen would have scampered with much less alacrity, had it not been 
for those confounded smooth bores ; and to excuse their misconduct on 
the field, he adds " that they wanted confidence in muskets.^' A little 
reflection will convince Mr. Stull, that they wanted something of more 
importance, — confidence in their leader, and in themselves. 

Men seldom act without motives. Since General Armstrong refused 
to give the rifles, he had a reason for the refusal. As far &s personally 
concerned, it must have been a matter of indifference to him what kind 
of weapon was drawn by Stull's corps from the public arsenal ; and in 
fact, had the Secretary been a mere popularity seeker, he would gladly 
have seized this occasion of gratifying the whims of a portion of the 
" sovereign people," though at the expense of his better judgment. 
Fortunately for the truth, it is in my power to show, ivhy the rifles were 
withheld ; and the following letters from General Armstrong to Mr. 
George Graham, of Virginia, and to Major-General Brown, will bring 
every candid reader to the conclusion, that in substituting muskets, the 
Secretary acted with strict regard to the public interest. 

" Sir,— We have not, either in store at this place, or at any other depot of arms, 
rifle-guns for distribution to militia. A few guns of this description were borrowed 
on a late occasion from the Indian Department. The number possessed by that 
Department did not exceed eighty. There may be eighty more at Harper's ferry, 
but they are destined for the rifle regiments of the United States. 

I am, &c., &c., 

G. Graham, Esq. J. Armstrong." 

Extract from a letter to General Brown : — 

" Throughout Smith's report, we see some stress attempted to be laid on the 
fact, that Stull's rifle company was armed with muskets. On this I would remark 
that Stull's company procured rifles in the summer of 1813— that in 1814, getting 
tired of these (like spoiled children) they wanted new ones, complaining 'that the 
bores of those they had were too small and needed too much wiping, and that the 
hammers of the locks were too soft, and did not always give fire. To these com- 
plaints I answered— that men really understanding the use of a rifle, and disposed 
to take care of it, would not make any objection to the smallness of the bores- and 
that if they would send such of the hammers as were too soft, to the Ordnance 
Department, they should be hardened. None were sent, and muskets were drawn 
By the way, this was the point I wished to bring them to. I well knew, that a 
hunting shirt and trousers did not make a rifleman, and that of the tinkers 
tailors, and cobblers, of Georgetown and Washington, there were not ten who 
knew anything of rifle shooting. 

But the reader, misled by Mr. McKenney's narrative, may say 

that after all, the guns might as well have been issued, as have been 
burned with other public stores. True j hut they were not burned ; and 



we have here another proof of the Ex-Superintendant's talent for mis- 
representation, even in trifles. Captain Stull, with proper caution, 
observes : " I will only further remark, that it was 7mder stood and be- 
lieved, that those very arms referred to, were destroyed by the British." 
McKenney, with characteristic boldness, says, " The rifles that would 
have been so eflicient in the hands of this admirahle company, never 
found their way to the Northern Army, hut icere consumed witli the Capi- 
"^tol and public buildings, on the •25th of August." Let me apply to 
this unqualified assertion, that formidable test, a public record. To 
estimate the extent of the national loss, in arms and ammunition, the 
Committee of Investigation called on the Commissary of Ordnance for 
a report of what was in store at the time of the British attack. From 
this report, I make the following extract. 

" In the military stores there was on hand previous to, and at tlie time of, the 
invasion, after considerable distributions had been made to the regular troops and 
militia, 2,993 stands of arms, 1,595 cartridge boxes, &c., 2,584 bayonet scabbards, 
&c., &c. 

" Of Rifles, it was impossible, though every exertion was made by this depart- 
ment, to procure a seasonable sitpply.''* 

Having disposed of this charge, let me now turn to another of more 
seeming importance, brought against Gen. Armstrong by McKenney, 
Smith, and Stull. I mean that of neglecting to arm and equip Colonel 
Minor's regiment in time to enable it to share in the battle of the 24th 
of August. Colonel Minor tells us, " that when he called on the 
Secretary of War, and requested an order for arms and ammunition, 
this functionary replied : ' it will be time enough to-morrow morning.'" 
Now, to what does this amount, unless it be shown, that there was not time 
enough to get the arms and marcli to the field between break of day 
and 1 o'clock p.m., when the action began ? Not even Mr. McKenney 
will venture on such an assertion, since both time and space would dis- 
prove it. But the reader will ask. Why did not Minor procure arms at an 
earlier hour ? Let the Col. himself give the answer : '^ Next morning,'" 
says that oflrtcer, "7 diligently sought Col. Carherry, witlwut being able to 
fold him ; and then went in search of Gen. Winder, who gave an order 
for the munitions wanting. On my arrival at the armory, I found that 
department in the care of a young man who dealt out the stores cau- 
tiously, which went greatly to consume time. At this place I found Col. 
Carherry, who introduced himself to me, and apologized for not being 
found, stating that he had left toivn the evening before, and had gone to 
Jiis seat in the country. ^^'\ 

Now, what must the reader think of Mr. McKenney's candor and of 
that of his abettors. Smith and Stull, who, with evidence like this before 
them, can yet charge the delay in the arming of Minor's regiment to 
the Secretary of War ? It would seem, that the miserable creatures 
by whom the War-minister was surrounded and beset, at that time, had 



* Report of Committee of Investigation, p. 322. 
t Report of Investigating Committee, p. 232. 



9 

determined to attribute to him the faults, or mistakes of every other 
public agent. If Colonel Carberry was absent from his post, General 
Armstrong was to be blamed. If Colonel Carberry's deputy was slow 
in his movements, the Socretary of War was to be made answerable. 

3d. I have now arrived at the third and last branch of inquiry. It 
remains for me to examine whether General Armstrong ever refused to 
give the necessary orders for the concentration of troops, or withheld 
from General Winder any assistance which it was in his power to offer. 
With respect to the first point, Mr. McKenney asserts that he did, and 
triumphantly refers to the evidence of General Walter Smith, " an up- 
right and honorable man, whose word needs no backer." I will give 
this upright witness fair play, and copy his evidence in extenso : 

" During the period, I had but one occasion of personal communication with 
Gen. Armstronij, but well remember that there was a general and indignant com- 
plaint among the officers of the District having ofikial communications with him, 
for his great apathy and inertness in regard to the defences of the District, and his 
frequent discourtesy towards those who pressed him on the subject. The instance 
of my personal communication with him was at the Battalion Old Fields, on the day 
precedii}3; the engagement at Bladensburg. At the time. Gen. Winder was absent 
reconnoitring, and in his absence I commanded the troops encamped at that place, 
numbering somewhat more than two thousand, and embracing in that number, be- 
sides my immediate Brigade, Commodore Barney's men and some other auxiliaries. 
The enemy were then but a short distance from us, with more than double our 
force, and we were expecting an attack during the day, which we had prepared to 
resist. At this sta-je a messenger arrived incamp frnm Col. JJ/mor, commanding 
a regiment from Fairfax county, Va., with a note to Gen. Winder, stating that he 
was approaching with his force, about a thousand strong, under orders for Alexan- 
dria; but the information received led him to believe it more important that he 
should move, instead, to Washington, so as to unite with the force then under Gen. 
Winder's immediate command, and an immediate reply would reach him at the 
point where the roads to the two cities diverged. 

" In the absence of Gen. Winder, this note was brought to, and read by, me ; 
and feeling the importance of such an accession to our force, I at once communicated 
it to Gen. Armstrong, then in camp, with a suggestion that, in the circumstances, 
he should issue the requisite order to Col. Minor. He treated the matter with 
great indifference, and in a very unsatisfactory way declined to give any order. I 
then carried the note to Mr. Madison, also in camp, who entertained a different 
view ; and on being told of Gen. Armstrong's course, gave the order direct to Col. 
Minor to move on to Washington, so as to unite with its. Under this order. Col. 
Minor reached Washington the same evening, but failed to unite with us at Bla- 
densburg in time to participate in the engagement, because of the delay at the War 
Department in furnishing his force with arms and ammunition." 

It is certain that the Ex-Superintendant believes, that with the help of 
this evidence, he has got me in a tight place. He presents the follow, 
ing dilemma, on the sharp point of one of the horns of which, I must, 
in his opinion, necessarily be empaled. "Either General Armstrong 
did not believe, on the 23d of August, that Washington would be at- 
tacked, and if so, Mr. McKenney's first narrative stands confirmed ; 
or else he did believe in the danger of the capital, and for a treache- 
rous purpose, refused to give an order for the march of a thousand 
gallant Virginians.'^ This looks formidable enough ; yet, let me see 
whether tliat "special pleading" which is shown in a close research 
of documentary evidence, or that "sophistry " which consists in draw- 
ing just conclusions from established premises, may not help me in 
my distress. 

2 



10 

The evidence furnished by Brigadier Smith, after the lappe of more 
than thirty years, contains two important assertions : 1st. That on the 
23d of August, during the absence of General Winder, a message was 
received at Battalion Old Fields, from Colonel Minor, requesting 
orders to proceed with his regiment to Wasliington ; and that Smith 
communicated this message to General Armstrong, who refused in give 
the order. 2d. That in consequence of this refusal, the order, at 
Smith's soJicilation, was sent directly to Minor by President Madison, 
who was then in the camp. Now, I pronounce, without liesitation, 
these pretended facts to be, what in the spirit of charity I will call, 
mental delusions of Mr. Smith. That they are false is proved, not by 
the vague recollections of a superannuated witness, but by testimony 
furnished to the investigating committee, two months after the capture 
of Washington, when events were still fresh in the memory of all, — 
by Lieut. Colonel Tayloe, and Colonel Minor. 

Hear Colonel Tayloe : — 

" I arrived at Washington on Sunday night, late (the 21st), and reported myself 
early the next morning to General Armstrong, who directed me to meet him at 
the War Otiice at 12 o'clock, and from whom I received the following order: 

" War Department, Av^vst 22d, 1S14. 
" General Order. — General Douglas will assemble his brigade at Alexandria, 
and hold it there subject to orders. 

" J. Armstrong." 

•' I immediately proceeded with all speed and executed the above order. Hav- 
ing received General Douglas's communication, I hastened to Washington and 
handed it to General Armstrong on Tuesday night, the 23d; wh'en he instantly 
sent me back to Virginia with the following orders, and with verbal directions to 
forward 07i the Virginia drafts with all possible speed." 

" War Department, Jlngust 23rf, ISI4. 
" General Onr}Kn.—Lieute7iant Colonel Minor will repair to Washington 
with the regiment under his command with the utmost despatch. He will report 
071 his arrival at Washington to Colonel Carberry, of the 36lh regiment of if. S. 
Infa7itry, a7id 7nake a requisition for ar/ns and ammunition. 

" J. Armstrong." 

" War Department, August '23d, 1S14. 
" General Order. — All militia now m and marchijig to Alexandria (be- 
sides that of Colonel Minor), will march immediately to Washington. 

" J. Armstrong." 

" For the purpose of executing those orders without loss of time, and after 
communicating by a dragoo7i loitli Colonel Minor, I proceeded down the north- 
ern neck to General Hungerford's brigade, then encamped at Seldon, near Potomac 
creek. 

" General Armstrong manifested much zeal and earnest solicitude for the de- 
fence of Washington, :im] instructed me to use my best exertions in hastening 
the troops for the attainment of that desirable object.* 

" John Tayloe, 

" Lieut. Col. of Cavalry, M.D.C. 

"Hon. R. M. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee of Investigation." 

Thanks to " special pleading," I already perceive an enlargement of 



* Report of Committee of Investigation, p. 234. 



11 

space and breathe more freely. Let us see whether Colonel Minor's 
testimony will not set me completely at my ease : — 

«' On Sunday, the 2Ist [I] received orders throup;h Brigadier General Douglas 
to repair with a detachment of ninety nnen, that had been previously placed in 
detail, to march at a moment's warning to the aid of General Hungerford, whose 
head-quarters were either in the counties of Westmoreland, King George, or 
Northumberland ; and to make one other requisition of a htmdred and forty men 
exclusive of officers, ^nd order them to the aid of General Winder, city of Wash- 
ington. On Monday evening, the 22d, received a verbal message from the Pre- 
sident, by Mr. John Graham, to hasten on the troops which had been ordered 
from my regiment [the li;^0 men] which w'ill more fully appear by said Graham's 
letter to General Winder, to which I beg leave to refer the committee. After 
informing Mr. Graham of the purport of the orders 1 had received, we both con- 
cluded it would be proper for him to return to Washington, and have the orders 
first alluded to countermanded, so as to justify me in marching with 7?iy M'^o/e 
force to the city ; which co7isisted as well as I can recollect of six himdred in- 
fantry and about 07ie himdrcd cavalry ; and the said Graham returned to Wren's 
tavern on Tuesday evening, the 23d, with General Winder's orders, written 

ON THE SAME LETTER TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED THE COMMITTEE. On 

receipt of which I took up my line of march, &c., &c.* 

" George Minor, Col. Com. 60th Regiment." 

The reader will probably agree with me, that I have effected my 
escape from the awkward position in which General Smith's imaginhtgs 
had placed me. The evidence of Minor, given under solemn circum- 
stances, and before a high national tribunal, shows, — that the orders 
under which he marched, emanatedyrom General Winder, who could not, 
as Smith says, have been absent from the camp, since he wrote the order re- 
quired ; consequently, the whole story about the communication by Smith of 
Minor's message to General Armstrong, and to the President, is a fabrica- 
tion or a delusion ; more, it is shown, that the intercourse between Mr. 
Madison and Colonel Minor was limited to a verbal message, having for its 
object the march of one hundred and ninety men, and sent on the '2'2d 
of August. 

That Minor's request for orders arrived in camp, on the 23d, after 
the President and Secretary had left it, and that neither of them knew 
anything about it, is placed beyond the reach of all cavilling by the 
preceding and following facts: on the 13th of August, Gen. Armstrong 
had been served with a special rule forbidding him to " issue any order 
having for its object the movement of troops,^' unless previously submitted 
to and approved by the President. f Now, the Secretary, as Tayloe 
shows, did issue an order for the march to Washington of Minor's and 
other militia corps, on the 23d — this order must, therefore, have received 
the President's sanction. Now, if Mr. Madison had known anything of 
Winder's communication to the Virginia Colonel, he would certainly 
have told the Secretary that any order from him relative to that move- 
meat was unnecessary. The fact is, that the commanding General in 



• Report of Committee, &-c., p. 231. 

t This order ia the President's hand-writing is in my possession. 



12 

the camp, and the Secretary in the Cabinet, both saw the necessity of a 
concentration of force, and gave almost simultaneous orders to effect 
it. — Is this "sophistry," Mr. McKenney ? 

The reader can now estimate with some exactness, the degree of 
credit which is due to the historical evidence of that " upright man 
whose word needs no backer." Had this gentleman, instead of trusting 
to a treacherous memory, or giving the reins to a more treacherous 
imagination, consulted existing documents, he would have spared me 
trouble, and himself 5/ta/;;e.* 

Let us now see how far the written and verbal communications 
between the Secretary and the Government, and commanding General, 
are of a nature to support the charge against the former, of" apathy" 
and " neglect." One note to Mr. lAIadison is in existence which proves, 
that when the War-minister found him on the point of sacrificing the 
fleet without fighting, he cautioned him against this misstep, and in a 
spirit almost prophetic, pointed out the evil results of this measure. 
"Should you destroy tile fleet without fighting, will it not lead to further 
aggression? A soldier's objects increase and multiply with his good 
fortune." In his letter to General Winder he was equally desirous to 
set and keep him right. On the 19th of August, he advised him to 
push forward his light troops and harass and impede the enemy ; on 
the 22d he counselled him to throw a corps on the flank of the British 
army, menace its communications, and paralyse its march wiiether 
directed to Baltimore or Washington ; on the 23d, according to Colonel 
McClane, he counselled Winder against risking a pitched battle in the 
field with raw, inefficient troops, and recommended the occupation of 
the Capital and grounds adjacent, as affording the best position of defence 
against an attack of rapid and Cossack-like nature. Verily, had there 
been found among the defenders of Wasliington, a little more of the 
same "apathy" which marked the conduct and advice of tlic Secretary, 
a day of disgrace would have been turned into a day of glory. 

I believe, I have thus answered, fairly and fully, the charges of 
apathy and neglect, so industriously circulated against the Secretary of 
War. Let me now see, if I cannot find in the conduct of the Smiths 
and McKenneys, an efficient cause of the national disaster ; something 
more criminal than " neglect," more disgraceful than " apathy." The 



* In a brief notice of Mi\ McKenney's card, I advised him to "look before he 
leaped." H;td he given the same caution to his friend Smith — this rash gentle- 
man would not now lie stretched in the gutter. Let me ask Mr. Smith, in his 
recumbent position, a few questions: How came it, that in liis long and minute 
report to the Committee of Investigation, in ISl'l, — a report in ichich he soxif^ht 
every possible occasion of attributing blame to the Secretari/ of War, — he should 
not have alluded to the latter's refusal to give Minor an order to march to 
Washington 1 A circumstance so decisively pointing out to the Investigating 
Committee, the author of the national calamity, was kept hidden by the " upright 
man whose word needs no baclcer," when its production was necessary to the ends 
of justice. Wliat caused tiiis suppression of important testimony, when the country 
demanded the truth and the irhule trnth ? Why was it kept '• bottled up" to this 
hour, and ordy uncorked to serve the special ])itrpose of his friend McKenney? 
These arc questions which Master Walter will lind it difficult to answer. 



13 

evidence I shall adduce will not be evidence of to-dmj, but statements 
made by disinterested witnesses, before the Investigating Committee. 

It will be remembered, that General Smith and liis brigade were 
encamped at Battalion Old Fields, about eight miles from Washington, 
on the evening of the 23d. Winder, the commanding General, having 
some experience in surprises, and distrusting the temper of his troops, 
determined to fall back that night upon the city. The resolution was 
not improper, although evincing perhaps too much caution, as the 
enemy were many miles distant. There are two ways, however, of 
making a retreat: the one, slow and orderly, — the other, rapid and 
disorderly. Let us see what was tlie character of the liackward 
movement, performed by Smith, and his brigade. Hear the evidence 
of Mr. John Law : 

" About 5 o'clock, p.m , after having remained some time in line of battle, we 
were ordered to retreat to \Vashington, and although cur march '.vas exfreme/y 
rapid, yet orders were occasionally given to hiirri/ o?i the men. The march literally 
became a 7-un of eight miles, and the propriety of this rapid movement which 
unnecessinly fatigued and dispirited the men, may be tested by the fact, that the 
main body of the enemy bivouacked that night on the Melwood estate, more than 
three miles distant from the ground we had left.* 

Hear Captain Burch of the Artillery : '-'Just as I had despatched the 
second division of my guns, the Aide-de-Camp of Brigadier Smith 
[Thomas L. McKenney] gave me orders to move with the whole as 
fast as possiile. As the main body had by this time got a considerable 
distance a head, I was unable to get up with the rear till they arrived 
at the Eastern Branch Bridge, when my men were so greatly fatigued, 
that they could scarcely stand by their guns." "j" 

What a picture ! the troops staggering under the weight of their 
arms, and breathless from the rapidity of their march, whilst foremost 
rode Smith, King Arthur of the Georgetown Round Table ; and press- 
ing his panting courser, came McKenney (" sharp rowel" among tlie 
Knights of the Spur), urging the exhausted artillery-men to efforts 
beyond nature, though there was not an enemy within four leagues ! 

Let us now examine the state of feeling that existed in the brigade, 
after the run of eight miles : hear Dr. Cattlet. He had slept within a 
mile of Battalion Old Fields, and ascertained at daybreak, that the 
enemy were not yet there. He rode to tlie city, which he reached at 8 
o'clock, and thus relates what he saw and heard : " The first news I 
heard on entering the city, was, that the enemy was within tico and a 
half miles coming to the bridge, and there appeared to be a continual 
succession oi false reports, and false alarms. The enemy were perti- 
naciously represented to be at least nine thousand. There appeared to 
be an impression with our troops, generally, that the enemy were much 
more formidable than appearances would justify.:]: 

And oy whom were created these unhappy impressions, which con- 
trih'.ied so much to dispirit the troops ? By the reconnoitrcrs, among 
w'.om figured, according to hisown account, Mr. Thomas L. McKenney, 



* Report of the Committee of Investigation, p. 315. t Report r. p. 257. 
X Report of the Committee, p. 3Q7. 



14 

who, seeing with the eyes of terror, magnified platoons into regiments, 
and regiments into brigades.* Is this " sophistry ?" 

Let me now direct the reader's attention to the following facts, each 
one of which has been fully established : 

1st. Mr. Madison made the plan of defence ; he consulted the Secre- 
tary of War only in common with other cabinet ministers. 

2d. Mr. Madison selected the military commander, against the advice 
and recommendation of the Secretary. 

3d. Mr. Madison served General Armstrong on the 13th of August, 
a few days before the opening of the campaign, with a rule forbidding 
him " to issue any orders having for their object the movement of troops, 
without the President's sanction and approval.^' 

And what was the motive for these extraordinary proceedings? To 
secure the monopoly oHaurels for the children of the "Old Dominion." 
Is it not clear as the sun at noon day, that if the enemy had been re- 
pulsed. General Armstrong would not have been allowed any credit for 
that result? He would have been met with the indubitable facts — that 
he had not /orwed the plan of defence, selected the victorious commander, 
or issued any military order except at the President's suggestion. But 
when " Hannibal reached the gates," and it became suspected that the 
coveted wreath might prove of nettles, Mr. Madison turned to the Secre- 
tary for support, and conferred a momentary command, withdrawn 
when the President reached the battle-field, and had time to consult 
with somebody. f 

Let me close by presenting Mr. McKenney with a dilemma more 
difficult than his own. If the charges of apathy and neglect brought 
by him and his Georgetown friends against General Armstrong were 
founded in error and prejudice, then is my cause gained ; if, on the 
other hand, they were true, what are we to tiiink of the conduct of the 
patriotic Madison, who, knowing these facts, yet almost at the last hour 
stood ready to confer upon the " apathetic " and " negligent " Secre- 
tary, the highest proof of confidence — the direction of the army ?:{: 



I have said, that another question of minor importance to be settled 
between Mr. McKenney and myself was his story of Carrol's public 

• Cannot the reader now touch with his finger one of the causes which led these 
Georgetown heroes, Smith, McKenney and others, to got up an excitement against 
General Armstrong and charge to his apathy, the effect of their misconduct 1 
The same motive that prompted them then is operative now, and pervades and 
perverts their vvholetestiinony. 

t Without the aid of spectacles, one may see the first traces of a "plot" in 
these preliminary arrangements. 

X See letter of" George'W. Campbell to the Committee ; also General Armstrong's 
letter to the same. — Pp. 10, 8-2, Report, &c. 

What was Gen. Armstrong's conduct when this proposition was made .' Did he 
refuse the command .' Did he say, as he might justly have said, " after trusting to 
others so long, you have no right to burden me with the resjionsibility of a game 
almost lost ?" No, even then he was willing to tempt his furtuno ; but, happily, 
*' there is a divinity above that shapes our ends," and the authority given him was 
withdrawn at the last moment. Had he beea actually in command, all my eSbrla 
against bis enemies, would have been vain. 



15 

affront offered to General Armstrong at Windmill Hill. The Ex-Super- 
intendant is solicitous to prove what, if true, would only show, (hat his 
accomplice, Carrol, was a bully and a braggart, who, when backed by a 
military mob, dared to face a better man than himself. But the evidence 
brought forward is of the most suspicious cliaracter. The principal 
witness. Smith, says that, "he first became aware of the Secretary's 
presence in the camp, by hearing from his quarters the voice of Carrol 
rejecting the proffered hand of General Armstrong." Now, without 
doubting the power, or the length of wise Walter Smith's ears, I may 
be permitted to remind him that to give evidence with regard to a fact 
which is only a subject of vision, it is necessary to see. Besides, it has 
been shown, that the Brigadier's memory is so much impaired, or his 
imagination so active, that his testimony with respect to historical events 
cannot be received with too much caution. 

Mr. Stewart says, that he heard the story ; but he admits, at the same 
time, that he heard 7nany stories. " One attributing to the Secretary a 
criminal correspondence with a relative, — an officer of the British 
army, wounded at Bladensburg ; — another, laying to his charge a bitter 
sarcasm on the sheepish qualities of the Georgetown Brigade," &c., 
&c. Each and all, save the last, of a character so manifestly absurd, 
as to excite now nothing but contempt, although at the time of their 
concoction and circulation, they no doubt perniciously influenced the 
minds of many citizens, more worthy than wise. There remains the 
letter of a Mr. Mallory, who says that he heard Carrol say, that he had 
refused the Secretary's hand. What then? If Carrol said so, it would 
be a reason the more for doubting it. 

With Mr. Carrol, General Armstrong was then, and had long been, on 
no hand-shaking terms. The former had very decidedly taken part in 
the quarrel between his bosom friend Wilkinson, and the Secretary of 
War ; and notwithstanding Mr. McKenney's distaste for moral evidence 
(probably because it is moral) I must be allowed to assert, that the 
silence of Wilkinson, who, at that time, was hunting through every 
purlieu of Washington, in search of slanders against the Secretary, in 
order to engraft and preserve them in his Memoirs, is of more force to 
show the story false, than all Mr. McKenney's hearsay evidence, to 
prove it true. 

Mr. McKenney indulges in a smile at my ignorance of military 
usages, because I had asserted in my Review that as the " aide of Gene- 
ral Smith," his services in the equipment of troops must have been 
limited to the brigade. By cunningly altering my text, and substituting 
Major General Van Ness for " General Smith," he seeks to fix upon 
me a blunder. Now, 1 never knew him as Van Ness's aid, nor has he 
offered any evidence but his own doubtful assertion, that in that capa- 
city he had any intercourse with the Secretary of M'^ar. The only 
proof he adduces to show that he knew General Armstrong at all, is a 
letter of Colonel Thompson, of Piscataway, who says, that when Adju- 
tant of his Legion in 1813, he despatched McKenney with a letter to 
the War Department, requiring a supply — not of arms — hu[ of diuretics 
and cathartics ; useful things no doubt, and cleansing to the bowels, but 
hardly to be considered as munitions of war, by any but an imaginative 



16 

man, like the Ex-Superintendant, who doubtless regarded them as such, 
because 1 lively to produce offensive operations. 

I have now reached that point when in turn I must be the assailant, 
and furnish evidence to justify the charge made by me against Mr. 
McKenney, of having been one of the principal agents in the George- 
town Plot. 

In my Review I said, — " Though these military mummeries fur- 
nished employment for the mass, there were a select few who turned 
the three days of the Secretary's absence to a more personal account. 
A committee purporting to represent the citizens of the district, w^as 
chosen to wait on tlie President, and demand General Armstrong's 
removal from office." No one wlio has not read Mr. McKenney's 
pamphlet can understand, how the meaning of these two plain sen- 
tences could be so far distorted as to represent me as asserting that 
"all the citizens of the district iield a meeting, and deputed Mr. Mc- 
Kenney and his associates as their representatives." Is it not obvious 
that I limit the movement to a kw plotters, who met, not in the public 
square, but in a more fitting place for their deliberations, some obscure 
tavern of the suburbs ? Is it not clear as day, that I do not speak of a 
committee openly appointed to express the ivill of the citizens of 
Georgetown, but of a set of men pretending to that character ? 

But Mr. McKenney has offered negative testimony to show that a 
plot having for its object the political ruin of General Armstrong was 
never heard of — no, not even by Brigadier Smith, who " has so quick 
an ear for distant sounds." Let me refer to a witness who Jieard at 
least a " rumor " of it. It is a person who has written a book entitled 
" Memoirs Official and Personal, with Sketches of Travels 

AMONG THE NORTHERN AND SoUTHEKJM INDIANS, EMBRACING A War EX- 
CURSION, AND DESCRIPTION OF SCENES ALONG THE WESTERN BORDERS." 

In the second chapter of this work the author tells us, that after 
General Armstrong w^is superseded in the office of Secretary of War 
by Mr. Monroe, " It was 21'hispered that this change had been produced 
by the undermining agency of Mr. Monroe. Whence the rumor came, 
or by whom it was originated, no one knew; but it remained a source 
of deep disquiet to harass Mr. Monroe to the hour of his death.'' 

Having thus shown to the ex-Superintendant's satisfaction that there 
was, at least, a " rumor " of the plot, let me now attempt to show its 
reality. 

Mr. McKenney seems to be blessed with one of those convenient 
memories, which, like india-rubber, may be either compressed, or 
.stretched to an indefinite extent. At times, he finds no difficulty in 
fishing up what he terms /ac/^ from the clear depth of his recollection; 
and after the lapse of thirty-two years, remembers, not only the sub- 
stance of opinions, but the very words in which they were expressed; 
at other times, he is a true non mi ricordo witness — a striking counter- 
part of Theodore Mnjocehi ; he has forgotten the snug closet where he 
passed a happy hour in the honorable society of the President, and as 
for the subject of their mysterious discourse, it seems blotted from his 
mind for ever. Not knowing the secret springs by which this elastic 
memory is moved, the attempt would be vain, on my part, to make him 



n 

recollect, and still more so, to draw from him an ackvow''c(lgmeni of the 
recollection. But, as far as the public is concerned, the following 
extracts from letters of individuals — whose superiority to Mr. McKenney 
in everything estimable, was such, that I deem it almost an affront to 
their memory to place their names in juxta-position with his — will show, 
that I ventured on no statement of facts, without sufficient authority. 
Let Mr. McKenney wipe the dust from his spectacles, and look at this. 

Extract from a letter of William Elliott, Esq., to General Armstrong, 
dated Washington City, October 14tli, 1815. 

" I have mada some inquiry, and have obtained snme information respecting 
the circumstances, attendinij; the G!or^etown dele^iation to the President; but 
have not as yet been fully able to ascertain alt the (acts; however, the following 
maybe rcHecI on as true. Messrs. Hanson, F.ditor of the Feder.il Republican, 
Washington Bowie, and Thotiias McK^cnney, at the request of several militia 
ofticers and others (amon^^st whom, I b.dieve, were Gen. Mason and Ciiarles Car- 
rol), waited on the President with a re(iuest to i-imove yuu from office ; or at least 
to deprive you of your authority in the District of Columbia. The President on 
being informed who were in waiting, and prr.bably knowin<; their mission, gave 
for answer, that he was busy, and could not then see them, but would be glad to 
see one of them at a more convenient time — probably designating Mr. McKenney; 
for he (Mr. McK ) waited on him afterwards, and was closeted with him above an 
hour. 'I'he result you know. More base, nor fouler means, were never taken (to 
my own knowledge and observation) than were taken to overthrow your well 
earned character, and just reputation." 

The reader will perceive, that the foregoing letter is the source from 
which my narrative was principally drawn. The inference, that 
*' McKenney carried back to his coadjulors the news only of a doubtful 
success." was clearly deducible from the fact, that, in order to quicken 
the fears and deliberation of Mr. Madison, it became necessary for the 
cabal, to get up the succe.ssful farce on Windmill Hill. It is obvious, 
that if the President's mind had been fully made up, and his promise 
given to McKenney at the closet consultation, the necessity for any dis- 
play of martial indignation, on the part of the Knights of the Spur, 
would not have existed. 

As corroborative proof of the reality of the pht, and of the character 
of the plotters, 1 shall now offer the following extract from a letter of 
General Desha, of Kentucky, written at Washington, September 20th> 
1814, or less than a month after the occurrence of the event to which 
it refers : — 

"I have a high opinion of the man who administers the p;ovcrnment : he pos- 
sesses a good heart : — but, if he had studied the book of nature a little more, — if 
he had a more thorough ktiowled;ie of man;, he would not be so often imposed on 
by designing sycophants, nor would he be driven from a correct course to conciliate 
a faction who will be satisfied with nothing short of getting into power." 

Had the old soldier of Kentucky searched his vocabulary for ex- 
pressions which should most deafly designate the Georgetown associa- 
tion, he could not have found any half so appropriate as the terms em- 
ployed: '^designing sycophants.'^ There is, positively, in these words, 
3 



18 

a pictorial power : they portray the agents of the intrigue as distinctly 
as the subsequent words, '• driven from a correct course, to conciliate a 
faction," represent the reluctant yielding of President Madison, and the 
motive of liis wavering conduct. 

Let me now place before the reader the letter of a private gentleman 
of Baltimore, who — removed by taste and temper from the evil in- 
fluences of political strife— had, unlike Mr. McKenney, no interest in 
disguismg truth, to promote either his own ends, or tliose of others. To 
the following extract I especially invite the reader's attention, since it 
places the reality of the Georgetown intrigue beyond the shadow of a 
doubt. 

John Holmes, Esq., to Gen. Armstrong, October 15th, 1814 : 

"Washinsrton Bowie is in town from W. He says— and I believe him — that 
the day before you returned to Washington, Madison, Monroe, Mason, and 
others of that stamp had a meeting ; the result was, that some atonement must 
be made for the disgrace at W., and that you were fixed on as the scape-goat." 

The reader has now before him the " precious confession " of 
one who was present at the secret council, where the victim was 
designated for the sacrifice. For the honor of human nature, and Mr, 
Madison's own, I cannot believe that he was one of that council : 
doubtless, all that Bowie meant to intimate was, that the President had 
identified himself with the conspiracy by receiving its deputation, and 
finally yielding to its requirements. But, with respect to " Mason, and 
others of that stamp," the evidence of a co-conspirator is conclusive, 
and I cannot sufficiently admire the modesty of Mr. McKenney, who, 
at this late date, would fain get rid of the credit belonging to the part 
which he took in this subtle, political manoeuvre. Certainly, when 
afterwards he became a candidate for ofiice, he was not quite so willing 
to renounce what formed in fact his only substantial claim to govern- 
ment patronage. 

But I may be met by the question — Who and what were the writers of 
these letters? Elliot was for many years chief clerk of the Patent 
Ofiice, under Dr. Thornton, and city Surveyor by appointment of the 
corporation of Wasiiington. " Until the day of his death," says a 
much esteemed correspondent,* " he was considered a man of probity, 
and one in whose statements every confidence could be placed.' He 
was a mathematician, too, of some repute, and I note this circumstance, 
because it has been remarked, that no men are more scrupulous in 
their admission of facts, than those whose minds have been disciplined 
by the study of the exact sciences. General Desha was, at the time 
he wrote, a distinguished member of Congress, and subsequently go- 
vernor of his native State ; and Holmes, as before said, was a worthy, 
high principled gentleman of Baltimore, who enjoyed during life the 
esteem, afiection, and credit of all wlio knew him. And now let me 
call the reader's attention to the fact, that these letters furnish no 
hegged evidence ; they were written by persons not having the remotest 



• Colonel C. K. Gardiner, Washington city. 



19 

connexion with each other; moving in different social circles, and 
deriving their information from sources as various as their tempers and 
pursuits : yet, mar]< how each directly points to the same conclusion — 
the existence of a plot at Georgetown to fix on General Armstrong the 
whole blame of the Bladensburg defeat. If Elliot's letter stood alone, 
it might be supposed to convey mistaken intelligence; but it receives 
additional strength from Desha, and "confirmation strong" in all 
essential particulars, from Bowie's confession, as detailed by Holmes. 
Springing from sources far apart, these streams of testimony flow 
together, and form, when united, a current of truth rapid enough to sweep 
before it every dike, that startled guilt can erect. 

But my budget of evidence is not yet exhausted. Among those 
whom the perils and exigencies of the British invasion brought to 
Washington, was a gallant soldier, who, though advanced in years, felt 
no diminution of the fire and spirit of other days. I allude to the late 
Colonel Allan McClane, a distinguished officer of the revolution, who, 
throughout this brief campaign, was usefully employed as Volunteer 
Aide of General Winder. Among his papers, now preserved in the Histo- 
rical Society of New York, is a sketch of the Bladensburg business, 
which, after severely touching upon the misconduct of the troops, ter- 
minates with the following words. 

"Such reflections are too mortifying; to dwell on. I must leave [the subject] 
to the impartial historian, but who will live to see the people of the United States 
prepared to receive the truth, and where is the man who will state facts ? You 
refused to breast the enemy, and when you have disgraced yourselves and your 
arms, you turn on the first men in office, denounce them as traitors, drive them 
into retirement, and cover your cowardice by your ingratitude. The manner in 
which General Armstrong ivas treated by the people of Columbia, after General 
Ross had retired to his ships, is sufficient to dampen the ardor of every honest 
patriot, and make us who have passed through the war of independence, retire 
from the ungrateful scene. That will astonish posterity, when the truth dare 
be told." 

High minded old man ! the fear which he felt lest the darkness of 
history should prove eternal, was not without foundation; he had 
marked the reign of obscurity for more than twenty years; had heard 
the denunciation of the innocent; seen the triumph of the iniquitous; 
and learned to distrust the maxim, " Magna est Veritas et prevalebit." 
Without indulging the ambitious hope of " astonishing posterity," I may 
be allowed to believe, that I have done something towards the elucida- 
tion of truth ; the dawn of a better day is visible, and my only I'egret 
is, that the gallant soldier of Lee's Legion is not living to see it and 
rejoice. 

I shall now take my leave of Mr. McKenney. His occupations in 
this world have been various — he has been a holiday soldier, a 
political hack, a Superintendant of Indian Affairs, an itinerant lecturer, 
and is now, an author by profession. Certainly, I should not have dis- 
turbed him in his literary speculations, had he not thought proper to 
insert in his book, a chapter of insidious calumny, directed against my 
father, in which he has impudently inserted the words, " General 
Armstrong vindicated," in order, doubtless, that the General's surviving 



Iriends and relatives, looking only at the title, should purchase his 
trashy volume, Ijcfore the error could be detected. 

Should any reader believe, that cither in my first or second 
notice of this gentleman's productions, I have ^vritten with too much 
severity, I beseech him to reflect on the nature of the provocation, 
and to' remember, that in a cause like mine, Charity itself would be 
merciless. 



As every reader of this Pamphlet cannot be expected to have within his reach, 
the means ot" ascertaining whether my references to, and quotations from, pub- 
lic and private documcnis, are correct ; and, as {'romlheunscnipulovs character 
of the persons with wliom I have to deal, 1 must, as fnr as possible, guard 
against misrepresentation ; I sought, and obtained, the following statement, 
from a gentleman of the highest character, generally known and as generally 
esteemed. 

" At Mr. Armstrong's request, 1 have examined the several references in his 
Pamphlet, to the printed documents, MS. letters, and the rule served on Gen. 
Armstrong, on the 13th August, 1814, prohibiting him from iiisui7ig any orders 
to officers ''relatiie to the moiemevt of troops, without the President's previous 
sanction, and find them correctly made ; and have no doubt of the genuineness 
of the papers and documents thus used by him. 

JOSEPH G. COGSWELL. 

New York, February 23, 1847." 



B C24 



EXAMINATION 



OF 



THOMAS L. M^'KENNEY'S REPLY 



TO 



THE REVIEW OF 



HIS NARRATIVE, & 



BY 



KOSCIUSZKO ARMSTRONG 



NEW YORK: 
B. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER, 112 FULTON STREET. 

1847. 



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